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INTRODUCTION
The re-entry of commercial banks into the securities business transformed U.S.
financial markets during the 1990s. Beginning in the 1980s, federal regulators and courts
began to open loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), which had
effectively banished commercial banks from the securities industry. In 1989, the Federal
Reserve Board permitted bank holding companies to establish “Section 20 subsidiaries,”
which could underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent. By 1996, Section
20 subsidiaries were able to compete effectively with securities firms as a result of the
Federal Reserve’s liberalization of the rules governing those subsidiaries. In 1998, the
Federal Reserve took a more dramatic step by allowing Citicorp, the largest U.S. bank
holding company, to merge with Travelers, a financial conglomerate that owned a major
securities firm, Salomon Smith Barney (SSB). That merger produced Citigroup, the first
U.S. universal bank since 1933, and it placed great pressure on Congress to repeal GlassSteagall. In November 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
which removed the most important Glass-Steagall barriers and allowed commercial
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banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by forming financial
holding companies.1
In adopting GLBA, Congress determined that the potential benefits of combining
commercial and investment banking outweighed concerns about promotional pressures
and conflicts of interest that were reflected in Glass-Steagall. Congress concluded in
1999 that Glass-Steagall was obsolete and counterproductive. Congress therefore
dismissed the relevance of Glass-Steagall’s findings that the combination of commercial
and investment banking during the 1920s had produced a wave of speculative financings,
an unsustainable economic boom, and the distribution of high-risk securities that inflicted
massive losses on unsophisticated investors.2
GLBA essentially ratified the securities powers that bank holding companies had
already obtained through the Federal Reserve’s Section 20 orders. By 1999, forty-five
banking organizations (including all of the twenty-five largest banks) had established
Section 20 subsidiaries. Three of those banks – Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (Chase)
and Bank of America – ranked among the top ten underwriters for U.S. securities in
1999.3 During 1999-2000, Citigroup’s investment banking fees exceeded $6.6 billion
and accounted for more than a fifth of Citigroup’s total revenues.4 In 2000, Citigroup,
Chase and Bank of America ranked among the top ten underwriters of global securities,
along with three major foreign banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche and UBS) and four U.S.
securities firms (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers).
That group of top global underwriters remained essentially the same during 2001-05.5
The six domestic and foreign banks included within that group achieved their
status in large part by acquiring securities firms in the United States and the United
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Kingdom.6 Leading securities firms responded to the banks’ competitive challenge by
acquiring FDIC-insured depository institutions. Securities firms were able to acquire
these bank-like institutions by taking advantage of loopholes in the statutes governing
bank and thrift holding companies. For example, Merrill Lynch acquired a thrift
institution and an industrial loan company (ILC) during the 1990s. Those institutions
currently hold $80 billion of deposits, and Merrill Lynch uses their deposits as the
primary funding source for its commercial lending, consumer lending and bond trading
activities.7 Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs also own ILCs,
although each of those ILCs currently holds less than $8 billion of deposits.8 Thus,
Merrill Lynch certainly qualifies as a universal bank in terms of offering a full range of
banking and securities services, and the other three major securities firms arguably fall
within that category as well.
Competition between commercial banks and securities firms helped to stimulate a
spectacular growth in the issuance of corporate securities during the late 1990s. Total
underwritings and private placements of corporate securities in U.S. financial markets
more than tripled, from $860 billion to $3.12 trillion, during 1994-2001.9 This rapid
expansion in corporate issues contributed to the stock market boom of 1994-2000, which
was comparable to the great bull market of 1923-29. Unfortunately, as in the 1920s, the
stock market boom of the 1990s was followed by a sharp decline during 2000-02.
During that decline, the total value of all publicly traded U.S. stocks fell by 40 percent,
from $17 trillion to $10 trillion, representing the worst long-term decline in stock values
since 1929-32.10
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The drop in stock prices accelerated between December 2001 and October 2002,
as investors reacted to reports of accounting fraud and self-dealing at many “new
economy” firms that had been viewed as “stars” during the stock market boom of the
1990s.11 The sudden collapses of Enron and WorldCom were especially shocking to
investors. With assets of $63 billion and $104 billion, Enron and WorldCom represented
the largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history.12 Investigations and lawsuits revealed
that universal banks played central roles in financing the rapid growth of Enron and
WorldCom, and in promoting the sale of their securities. Government officials penalized
universal banks for their involvement with Enron and WorldCom, and officials also
brought enforcement actions against universal banks for a wide range of other
misconduct related to their securities activities, including (i) conflicts of interest among
research analysts, resulting in the issuance of biased and misleading reports to investors,
(ii) manipulative and abusive practices connected with initial public offerings (IPOs), and
(iii) late trading, market timing and other abuses involving mutual funds.13
This chapter is part of a larger project that will examine the role of universal
banks during the U.S. economy’s boom-and-bust cycle of 1994-2002. In particular, I
intend to consider whether the combination of commercial and investment banking
activities during the 1990s created promotional pressures and conflicts of interest that (i)
caused universal banks to underwrite risky securities and extend speculative loans, (ii)
led universal banks to issue offering prospectuses and research reports that promoted the
sale of those risky securities without proper disclosure of the investment risks, and (iii)
induced universal banks to disregard legal prohibitions on deceptive practices and their
own policies against abusive transactions. This chapter focuses on the involvement of
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universal banks with Enron and WorldCom. While many scholars have analyzed the
Enron and WorldCom scandals, to my knowledge only two legal academics – James
Fanto and Hillary Sale – have given substantial attention to the role of universal banks in
those scandals.14 The analysis in this chapter builds upon their important work.
The evidence presented below supports several conclusions. First, the desire for
investment banking fees caused universal banks to enter into structured-finance
transactions with Enron, even though bank officials recognized that that the transactions
(i) were inherently deceptive, (ii) were contrary to their banks’ risk management policies
and (iii) exposed their banks to serious reputational risk and legal liability. Second,
universal banks competed for investment banking mandates by providing extraordinary
financial favors to senior corporate executives of Enron and WorldCom, notwithstanding
the obvious corruption inherent in those favors. Third, universal banks distributed
offering prospectuses and research reports that encouraged investors to buy Enron’s and
WorldCom’s securities, even though bank officials knew or should have known that the
promotional documents were materially misleading and failed to disclose significant
investment risks. Indeed, some banks quietly arranged hedging transactions to reduce
their credit exposures to Enron and WorldCom concurrently with their publication of
materials encouraging investors to buy the companies’ securities. Other banks fired
analysts who published critical reports about Enron. Finally, universal banks repeatedly
extended credit to Enron and WorldCom in order to attract investment banking business,
even though bank officers had serious concerns about the financial viability of both
companies.
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Thus, the Enron and WorldCom episodes demonstrated an appalling failure of
corporate governance safeguards at universal banks as well as their clients. The actions
of universal banks with respect to Enron and WorldCom also revealed the existence of
promotional pressures, conflicts of interest, speculative financing and exploitation of
investors, which were similar to the perceived abuses that caused Congress to separate
commercial and investment banking in 1933. Beyond the injuries suffered by investors
and the broader economy, the universal banks’ misconduct related to Enron and
WorldCom raises troubling questions about the risks to the financial system created by
the commingling of commercial and investment banking. By November 2006, universal
banks had paid $15 billion, and had surrendered creditor claims of about $3 billion, in
order to settle enforcement actions, civil lawsuits and bankruptcy proceedings related to
Enron and WorldCom. The losses suffered by universal banks, which have not yet been
fully determined, far exceed the fees they received from Enron and WorldCom. For
example, Enron and WorldCom paid Citigroup about $330 million, but Citigroup has
already paid nearly $5 billion to settle claims related to its work for those companies.15
The magnitude of the foregoing losses indicates that GLBA’s regulatory scheme is not
adequate to control the risks posed by universal banking powers to our largest banks –
the same banks that are most likely to receive “too big to fail” treatment from financial
regulators.16
UNIVERSAL BANKS AND ENRON
The Rise and Fall of Enron
Enron was one of the most glamorous and admired companies during the stock
market boom of the late 1990s. Enron’s reported revenues increased from less than $10
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billion in 1995 to $20 billion in 1997, $30 billion in 1998, $40 billion in 1999, and $100
billion in 2000. Enron’s market capitalization reached $70 billion at its peak in August
2000. Measured by reported revenues and market capitalization, Enron was the seventh
largest corporation in the United States. For five consecutive years, from 1997 through
2001, Fortune magazine ranked Enron as the “Most Innovative Company in America.”17
Enron’s management, led by Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, transformed
Enron from an operator of natural gas pipelines in the 1980s to a highly diversified
company with four primary business segments at the end of the 1990s. Enron’s major
segments were (i) Transportation Services, which operated Enron’s traditional natural gas
pipelines and an electric utility, (ii) Wholesale Services, which operated trading markets
for futures contracts and other derivative instruments based on a wide range of
commodities, (iii) Energy Services, which sold energy products to commercial and retail
customers, and (iv) Broadband Services, which sought to be “the world’s largest
marketer of bandwidth and network services [and] … the world’s largest provider of
premium content delivery services.” Enron also made extensive “merchant investments”
in a wide array of ventures, including foreign power plants, foreign water systems, and
many speculative, high-technology companies.18 By 2000, Enron’s highly-publicized
business units for bandwidth trading and for providing broadband services to households
persuaded Wall Street that Enron deserved an “Internet-style valuation,” which was far
higher than Enron could have achieved as an energy company. 19
Enron also became a de facto financial institution by the late 1990s, due to its
heavy involvement in trading commodities and financial instruments. Skilling was the
architect of Enron’s financial services strategy, which grew out of his success in
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establishing a “gas bank” at Enron in the early 1990s. The “gas bank” was very
profitable, and Enron became the leading supplier of futures and other derivative
contracts for delivery of natural gas. Enron tried to extend Skilling’s “gas bank” concept
by creating trading markets and risk management products for a wide variety of
commodities, including electricity, water, pulp and paper, coal, steel and broadband.
Skilling believed that Enron should buy “hard assets” in targeted industries solely for the
purpose of establishing a base for trading operations, and should then sell off the assets
after it developed a trading capability. 20
Skilling based his “asset light” strategy on the assumption that Enron could use its
trading expertise and Internet technology to “monetize” all types of assets. Skilling was
convinced that Enron had the potential to become the dominant trader for every
conceivable type of commodity or contract.21 In Enron’s 2000 annual report, the
company proclaimed its “unrivaled access to markets and liquidity” and also declared
that “[w]hen customers do business with Enron, they get our commitment to reliably
deliver their product at a predictable price, regardless of market conditions.”22
Enron pursued three additional strategies, which contained the seeds of its
destruction. First, Enron obtained permission from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to adopt the mark-to-market (MTM) accounting method for certain
of Enron’s trading activities. Without seeking the SEC’s approval, Enron extended
MTM accounting to many of its other businesses. By 2000, Enron accounted for more
than a third of its assets under the MTM method. MTM accounting allowed Enron to
carry those assets at “fair value” based upon publicly quoted prices or (in most cases) its
own estimates of fair value. Additionally, MTM accounting enabled Enron to record in a
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single year all the profits that it expected to accrue over the life of a financial contract,
power plant or other newly-acquired asset. Second, Enron’s compensation system
rewarded employees for increasing the company’s quarterly earnings, thereby
encouraging Enron’s officers to make deals with the maximum short-term impact on
profits. In combination, MTM accounting and Enron’s compensation system produced
an aggressive, deal-oriented corporate culture in which managers approved contracts and
authorized new projects to achieve short-term earnings goals, with little or no regard for
the long-term viability of those ventures.23
Third, as stated in its 2000 annual report, Enron pledged that it would be “laserfocused on earnings per share,” and that it would maintain “investment grade status,”
which was “critical to the success of [Enron’s] wholesale [trading] business as well as its
ability to maintain adequate liquidity.”24 Enron’s commitment to produce steady growth
in earnings per share (EPS) and to maintain an investment-grade credit rating made the
company a favorite of institutional investors. By late 2000, mutual funds, pension funds
and other institutional investors held 60 percent of Enron’s stock, and those investors did
not begin to abandon Enron until October 2001, after the company disclosed that
accounting violations would force it to write down its assets by more than $2 billion.25
Enron’s promises ultimately created a financial trap from which it could not
escape without fraud. Analysts and credit ratings agencies expected Enron to produce
consistent growth in cash flow revenues and EPS. However, Enron’s MTM accounting
produced a mismatch between cash flow and earnings, because Enron reported MTM
earnings well in advance of its receipt of actual revenues. Many of Enron’s speculative
ventures proved to be disappointments or outright disasters and did not produce the
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expected revenues. Enron therefore needed external funding sources to provide the cash
flow that its internal operations failed to generate. Enron’s management was unwilling to
obtain the needed funds by issuing new stock, because that would dilute the company’s
EPS. Management was also unwilling to issue new debt, because that would undermine
Enron’s investment-grade credit rating.26
Because of its unwillingness to issue equity or debt, Enron entered into a
bewildering array of structured-finance transactions. Enron’s structured-finance deals
were designed to achieve the following objectives: (i) to generate fictitious revenues and
earnings, (ii) to obtain de facto loans while disguising Enron’s obligations to repay those
loans, (iii) to move poorly-performing assets off Enron’s balance sheet into specialpurpose entities (SPEs) controlled by Enron or its officers, and (iii) to create accounting
hedges against declines in the MTM values of Enron’s more volatile assets.27 By
November 2001, Enron had accumulated actual debt obligations of $38 billion, but only
$13 billion appeared on its balance sheet.28
Enron’s officers believed that the company’s structured-finance transactions
would provide “bridge” financing and would “maintain the impression that Enron was
humming until . . . [the company] started raking in real profits” from the “big enchilada”
projects conceived by Skilling.29 Unfortunately, Skilling’s projects failed, and the hopedfor profits did not materialize.30 When Enron finally began to disclose the magnitude of
its accounting manipulations in October 2001, the company quickly lost the confidence
of its investors, creditors and trading counterparties. Enron filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization on December 2, 2001, shortly after last-ditch merger
negotiations with Dynegy failed.31
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Universal Banks as “Enablers” of Enron’s Fraud
Neal Batson, Enron’s bankruptcy examiner, determined that “[t]here is sufficient
evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude” that nine universal banks “had actual
knowledge of the wrongful conduct of [Enron’s] officers” and “gave substantial
assistance to the officers by participating in the structuring and closing of the SPE
transactions.”32 Similarly, Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind concluded that banks were
“Enron’s enablers . . . the best supporting actors of the Enron scandal – without whose
zealous participation Enron’s financial shenanigans would simply not have been
possible.”33 Hillary Sale also agreed that “[b]anks were a significant part of what ‘went
wrong’ at Enron. . . . Without the banks, the [SPE] transactions would not have
occurred.”34
Enron’s deal-focused culture and its constant need for new sources of financing
made it a favorite client of universal and investment banks. “By the late 1990’s, Enron
had become one of the largest payers of investment banking fees in the world” and
obtained services from more than seventy banks.35 Andrew Fastow, Enron’s chief
financial officer, created a tournament that forced banks to compete against each other
for Enron’s favor. Fastow divided Enron’s banks into “Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3”, and a
bank could earn “Tier 1” status only if it was prepared “to lead/structure complex,
mission-critical deals,” to “[u]nderwrite $1 billion in [a] short period of time,” and to
provide an “[a]ccount officer capable of delivering [the] institution” so that it would do
Enron’s bidding. 36 Many banks readily accepted Fastow’s terms, even though Enron was
a notoriously difficulty client. As one banker said, “It was hell doing business with them,
but you had to because they were so big.”37
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The Enron bankruptcy examiner’s reports provide detailed descriptions of the
involvement of universal banks in Enron’s structured-finance deals.38 This chapter
focuses on four types of transactions, which banks arranged for Enron despite their clear
awareness of the deception and corruption inherent in those transactions.
First, Enron used prepaid commodity swaps (“prepays”) to obtain disguised loans.
In the typical prepay, the lending bank transferred funds to a bank-controlled SPE, and
the SPE then “paid” those funds to Enron in exchange for Enron’s “agreement” to deliver
specified commodities. A series of offsetting swap agreements among the bank, the SPE
and Enron effectively eliminated Enron’s agreement to deliver the commodities and
instead obligated Enron to pay a fixed sum of money plus interest to the lending bank.
Although the prepays were functionally equivalent to loans, Enron reported the proceeds
as cash flow from operating activities and recorded its payment obligations as liabilities
from “price risk management activities.” Thus, prepays enabled Enron to inflate its
reported cash flow and to disguise its actual debt obligations.39 Citigroup and Chase
arranged more than $8.3 billion of prepay transactions for Enron between 1992 and 2001.
Barclays, Credit Suisse, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Toronto Dominion Bank also
participated in prepay transactions.40 According to one Enron risk manager, “[t]he banks
liked [prepays] because Enron got addicted . . . . Enron had to repay the loan[s], but the
cash flow didn’t materialize. So [the prepays] snowballed.”41
“Minority interest transactions” were a second type of structured-finance device
that provided disguised loans to Enron. Citigroup provided $1.75 billion of de facto
loans to Enron through three “minority interest transactions” that were completed at the
end of 1997, 1998 and 1999. Citigroup developed the concept for these transactions and
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marketed the concept as a proprietary product. In the 1999 transaction (known as Project
Nahanni), Citigroup provided a $485 million loan to Nahanni, an SPE established and
controlled by Citigroup. Citigroup also arranged for a group of investors to buy $15
million of equity in Nahanni in order to meet the SEC’s three percent outside equity
ownership requirement for avoiding consolidation of Nahanni’s financial statements with
those of either Enron or Citigroup. Nahanni used the funds it received from Citigroup
and the investors to purchase $500 million of Treasury securities, which it then
contributed as a “minority investment” in Marengo, an Enron-controlled entity. At
Enron’s direction, Marengo sold the Treasury bills on December 29, 1999, and Marengo
sent the $500 million sale proceeds to Enron.
In January 2000, Enron caused Marengo to “repurchase” Nahanni’s minority
interest for $487.1 million. Nahanni used those funds to repay Citigroup’s $485 million
loan together with $2.1 million in imputed interest. Thus, in practical effect, Citigroup
used Project Nahanni to provide a $485 million loan to Enron for a one-month period.
However, Enron did not report Project Nahanni as a loan. Instead, Enron reported the
$500 million of Treasury bills contributed by Nahanni as a “minority interest” on its
1999 balance sheet, which it then “repurchased” in 2000. In addition, Enron reported the
sale of the Treasury bills on its 1999 income statement as $500 million of cash flow from
“merchant investment” activities. Like the prepays, Project Nahanni and the other
“minority interest” transactions inflated Enron’s reported cash flow while disguising its
actual debt.42
A third series of structured transactions enabled Enron to create fictitious “sales”
of assets to Enron-controlled SPEs. During 2000 alone, Enron relied on asset sales to

13

SPEs to increase its reported operating cash flow and its reported earnings by more than
35%.43 For example, in Project Bacchus, Enron contributed its pulp and paper trading
business to an off-balance-sheet SPE named Fishtail, in exchange for 80% of Fishtail’s
equity. Enron asserted that it did not have to consolidate Fishtail on its balance sheet,
because three percent of Fishtail’s equity was held by LJM2, a purportedly independent
partnership that was actually controlled by Fastow. On December 20, 2000, Enron sold
its 80% interest in Fishtail for $200 million to Sonoma, another SPE. Citigroup provided
Sonoma with a $194 million loan and a $6 million equity infusion, thereby enabling
Sonoma to “buy” Enron’s interest in Fishtail and to avoid any consolidation with Enron.
Using a total return swap, Enron guaranteed repayment of Citigroup’s $194 million loan,
and Fastow orally committed to repurchase Citigroup’s $6 million equity investment.
Enron’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that (i) Project Bacchus did not represent a “true
sale” of Enron’s pulp and paper trading business, because both Fishtail and Sonoma
should have been consolidated with Enron, and (ii) Project Bacchus effectively
represented a $200 million loan from Citigroup to Enron. Nevertheless, Enron reported
Project Bacchus on its 2000 income statement as generating $200 million in cash flow
from operations and $112 million in MTM earnings resulting from the “sale” of its pulp
and paper trading business. In addition, Enron did not report its swap obligation to repay
Citigroup’s loan as debt on its balance sheet.44
Barclays, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Credit Suisse and RBS
helped Enron to make similar fictitious “sales” of assets to off-balance-sheet SPEs.
CIBC’s role was particularly significant, as it participated in eleven SPE transactions that
enabled Enron to inflate its reported MTM earnings by nearly $600 million and its
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reported cash flow by more than $1.7 billion, while understating its reported debt by
more than $1 billion.45
The most notorious of these asset “sales” was Enron’s sale of Nigerian barges to
an SPE established by Merrill Lynch at the end of 1999. Enron needed to sell the barges
to generate earnings but could not find an arms’ length buyer at the desired price. At
Enron’s request, Merrill Lynch established an SPE to purchase the barges and invested
$7 million to capitalize the SPE. Fastow gave his oral assurance that Enron would
repurchase Merrill Lynch’s equity interest within six months and would also give Merrill
Lynch a 15% return on its investment. Merrill Lynch’s $7 million investment (together
with a $21 million loan from Enron) provided the SPE with funds that were used to buy
the Nigerian barges for $28 million. Enron reported the transaction on its 1999 income
statement as producing $12 million in MTM earnings from the “sale” of the barges, even
though the transaction did not meet the requirements for a “true sale” to an unaffiliated
party. Merrill Lynch also participated in another sham transaction requested by Enron at
the end of 1999 – a pair of offsetting electricity swaps that were effectively “mirror
images” in their essential terms. The matched swaps had no substance, but Enron used
them to report $50 million of additional earnings on its 1999 income statement.46
A fourth series of SPE transactions provided accounting hedges for Enron’s
merchant investments in speculative, high-technology companies. These hedging
transactions had two primary purposes: (i) to lock in gains in the MTM values of some of
Enron’s merchant investments, and (ii) to protect Enron’s balance sheet against future
declines in the values of such investments. To create each of the desired hedges, Enron
established an SPE in which either LJM1 or LJM2 – purportedly independent
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partnerships that were controlled by Fastow – held the required three percent equity
interest. Enron then entered into a total return swap with the SPE. Under the swap,
Enron agreed to pay an amount equal to any increase in the MTM value of the underlying
investment and the SPE agreed to pay an amount equal to any decline in the MTM value
of that investment. Thus, the SPE’s payment obligation under the swap offset any MTM
loss that Enron might suffer on the underlying investment. However, the hedges were
illusory, because Enron capitalized the SPEs with contributions of its own stock. When
Enron’s stock price plummeted in 2001, the SPEs could no longer perform their payment
obligations and the hedges collapsed.47
Credit Suisse and RBS provided the outside capital for LJM1 and received
handsome returns on their investments. They also participated in transactions involving
LJM1 that enabled Fastow and his associates to reap personal benefits of more than $40
million, even though officials at both banks recognized the impropriety of Fastow’s selfdealing.48 Based on LJM1’s success, Fastow persuaded Enron’s board to authorize LJM2
– “a big, all-purpose private equity fund” that would enable Enron to “manage its
investment portfolio risk, funds flow, and financial flexibility.”49 Fastow chose Merrill
Lynch to serve as the financial advisor and private placement agent for LJM2. Fastow
insisted that Enron’s banks must make substantial equity investments in LJM2 if they
wanted to maintain “Tier 1” status for Enron’s banking business. Merrill Lynch and its
partners invested more than $20 million in LJM2, and Enron’s other banks contributed an
additional $80 million. The banks’ up-front investments enabled Fastow and Merrill
Lynch to recruit other institutional investors, including insurance companies and pension
funds. Fastow and Merrill Lynch ultimately raised $400 million of equity capital for
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LJM2, which enabled LJM2 to become “the single most powerful tool for managing
Enron’s earnings.”50
In addition to the foregoing SPE deals, Enron executed a series of tax-related SPE
transactions that were engineered by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche’s structured transactions
produced tax benefits that increased Enron’s reported income by more than $400 million
during 1997-2001. Enron’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that these transactions
“were, for the most part, artificial transactions lacking a bona fide business purpose other
than the creation of accounting income for Enron.”51
The Banks’ Awareness of Enron’s Fraud
Enron’s bankruptcy examiner determined that the SPE transactions disguised $14
billion of debt obligations by moving those obligations off Enron’s balance sheet.52 The
banks knew that Enron was using SPE transactions to inflate its reported cash flows and
earnings and to hide debt obligations, thereby misleading investors, analysts and credit
ratings agencies. Credit Suisse and RBS also recognized that their involvement in LJM1
enabled Fastow and his associates to receive improper self-dealing benefits. Despite this
knowledge, the banks viewed Enron as a highly desirable customer, and they dismissed
the financial and reputational risks created by Enron’s manipulative transactions.
Bank officials plainly recognized the deceptive nature of the structured-finance
deals that their banks arranged for Enron. A Chase officer remarked that “Enron loves
[prepay] deals as they are able to hide funded debt from their equity analysts.”53
Similarly, Citibank’s Capital Markets Approval Committee noted that a prepay swap
requested by Enron was “effectively a loan, [but] the form of the transaction would allow
[Enron] to reflect it as ‘liabilities from price risk management activity’ on their [sic]
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balance sheet and also provide a favourable [sic] impact on reported cash flow from
operations.”54 Officials at Credit Suisse acknowledged that a prepay transaction the bank
was structuring for Enron had “accounting driven” elements, and one officer asked, “Is it
OK for us to be entering into such an ‘obvious’ loan transaction?”55
Bank officials also recognized the deceptive impact of Enron’s other SPE
transactions. A Merrill Lynch officer noted that his firm’s “mirror image” electricity
swap with Enron at the end of 1999 “clearly help[ed] them make earnings for the quarter
and year (which had a great value in their stock price, not to mention personal
compensation).”56 Several banks understood that Enron was probably violating
accounting rules when it excluded the assets and liabilities of various SPEs from Enron’s
balance sheet. As a condition of investing in those SPEs, the banks required Enron’s
officers to give oral assurances that Enron would repurchase the banks’ three percent
equity interests. Given Enron’s assurances, the banks understood that their equity
investments were not truly “at risk,” a situation that required consolidation of the SPEs
onto Enron’s financial statements.57 For example, CIBC officers described their bank’s
equity investments in SPEs as “trust me” transactions, because (i) “[u]nfortunately there
can be no documented means of guaranteeing the equity [investment] … or the sale
accounting treatment is affected,” and (ii) CIBC obtained “the strongest assurance (but
not guarantee) from Enron senior management that we would not incur losses. They
have lived up to their word so far.”58 A Barclays official similarly reported that he had
received “explicit verbal support” from Ben Glisan, Enron’s treasurer, who stated that
“under all circumstances” Enron would “repay in full” Barclays’ equity investment in the
SPE.59
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The banks also knew that Enron was structuring deals with SPEs to inflate
earnings and hide debt. A Credit Suisse officer described the Osprey Trust SPE
transaction as “a vehicle enabling Enron to raise disguised debt which appears as equity
on Enron’s balance sheet” while “serv[ing] the added purpose for Enron of being an off
balance sheet parking lot for certain assets.”60 RBS officials described Enron’s SPE
transactions as “21st Century Alchemy.”61 Citigroup’s managers referred to Project
Nahanni as “year-end window dressing” and “essentially, an insurance policy for [yearend] balancing.”62 In describing Project Bacchus, a Citigroup officer explained that
“Enron’s motivation in the deal now appears to be writing up the asset in question from a
basis of about $100MM to as high as $250MM, thereby creating earnings.”63 Another
Citigroup officer confirmed that “Bacchus is part of a program designed to ensure that
Enron will meet its debt/cap targets.”64
Several bank officials objected to Enron’s SPE deals because of the transactions’
deceptive nature and the potential risks they created for the banks. One Merrill Lynch
officer opposed the Nigerian barge transaction because it would “aid/abet Enron income
statement manipulation,” and he warned that his firm would face serious “reputational
risk” if a “credit meltdown” occurred at Enron.65 Similarly, a Citigroup officer
questioned the “appropriateness” of Project Bacchus in view of the “earnings dimension
to this deal.”66 Citigroup’s head of global risk management objected to the Sundance
Industrial transaction, whose purpose was to refinance Project Nahanni, because “[t]he
GAAP accounting is aggressive and a franchise risk to us if there is publicity.”67
Similarly, two Credit Suisse officers expressed serious concerns about the “significant
reputational risk” created by their bank’s involvement in LJM1, given Fastow’s clear
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conflicts of interest and the personal benefits Fastow expected to receive from LJM1’s
dealings with Enron.68
In each case, however, the banks went forward with the deals because they
wanted to maintain their lucrative relationships with Enron. A Merrill Lynch officer
defended the Nigerian barge deal by arguing that the deal would “differentiate [Merrill
Lynch] from the pack and add significant value.”69 A Citigroup officer highlighted the
importance of Project Bacchus by explaining that “[f]or Enron, this transaction is
‘mission critical’ (their label not mine) for [year-end 2000] and a ‘must’ for us.”70 After
Project Bacchus was approved, a Citigroup officer remarked, “Sounds like we made a lot
of exceptions to our standard policies. I am sure we have gone out of our way to let them
know that we are bending over backwards for them . . . let’s remember to collect this iou
when it really counts.”71 Credit Suisse decided to invest in LJM1 because Skilling told a
Credit Suisse officer that the LJM1/Rhythms transaction was very important to Enron,
and because Credit Suisse wanted to strengthen its relationship with Enron and Fastow.
After completing a refinancing of LJM1 that resulted in significantly higher payments to
Credit Suisse, RBS and Fastow, a Credit Suisse banker explained that that the refinancing
“has provided a significant return to [Credit Suisse] and has further enhanced our
relationship with Andrew Fastow.” The banker’s supervisor praised her for doing “an
excellent job.”72
In fact, Enron’s banks had powerful financial incentives to satisfy Enron’s
demands. During 1997-2001, Enron’s top banks received the following fees from Enron:
Citigroup – $188 million; Credit Suisse – $94 million; Chase – $86 million; Deutsche –
$72 million; Merrill Lynch – $63 million; RBS – $60 million; and CIBC – $30 million.73
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Not surprisingly, the banks prized their relationships with Enron. Citigroup ranked
Enron as “one of the highest revenue clients within Citigroup,” Chase described Enron as
“our single largest client,” RBS lauded Enron as one of its “most remunerative clients,”
and Credit Suisse viewed Enron as “a Firm wide … priority”74 Perhaps the most
revealing comment appeared in a CIBC internal memorandum, which explained that
Enron’s SPE transactions were “[n]ot terribly popular with [CIBC’s] risk management
[group], but the returns changed their minds!”75
The Banks’ Failure to Protect Enron’s Investors
In addition to their roles in Enron’s SPE transactions, universal banks served as
underwriters or private placement agents for many public offerings and private
placements of debt and equity securities by Enron and its affiliates. Citigroup, Merrill
Lynch and Credit Suisse each participated in more than twenty public and private
offerings of Enron-related securities.76 During 1998-2001, those three banks, along with
Chase, CIBC, Barclays, Lehman Brothers and Bank of America, underwrote offerings for
several billions of dollars of Enron-related securities.77 After Enron collapsed, investors
filed a class action lawsuit, which alleged that the banks failed to satisfy their duties as
underwriters under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act). The lawsuit
charged that the banks did not exercise due diligence and, as a consequence, the offering
materials failed to disclose Enron’s business and financial problems and its deceptive
accounting. 78 In addition, the lawsuit claimed that the banks were liable for securities
fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), because
they knowingly or recklessly distributed misleading offering materials and participated in
other fraudulent practices (including the SPE transactions).79
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The class action plaintiffs further alleged that the banks committed securities
fraud by causing their investment analysts to issue highly favorable research reports
about Enron despite the banks’ knowledge of Enron’s growing problems.80 By 1999,
Enron’s banks were aware of Enron’s difficulties in generating operating revenues to
match its reported MTM earnings, and the banks also knew that Enron was executing
dozens of accounting-driven SPE transactions that generated large off-balance-sheet
liabilities. By 2001, Enron’s banks recognized that the company was heavily leveraged,
had significant liquidity problems and depended on a continuous stream of new
financings. During this period, several of the banks quietly reduced their credit
exposures to Enron by entering into credit default swaps, surety agreements and other
hedging transactions.81
Despite the banks’ awareness of Enron’s increasingly severe problems, their
investment analysts continued to publish favorable reports about Enron until shortly
before Enron’s collapse. In October 2001, “all sixteen investment analysts tracked by
Thomson Financial/First Call rated Enron a ‘buy,’ and thirteen called it a ‘strong buy,’”
notwithstanding a fifty percent decline in Enron’s stock price and the publication of
articles in the financial press that questioned the validity of Enron’s financial
statements.82 In November 2001, “eleven of the thirteen analysts following Enron still
recommended that the public purchase the stock, and only one recommended selling it,”
even though Enron had disclosed a $1.2 billion writedown in its assets as well as an SEC
investigation into its accounting practices,83 The only analyst with a “sell”
recommendation in November 2001 was employed by Prudential Securities, which did
not engage in investment banking activities.84
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Indeed, universal banks placed great pressure on their investment analysts to issue
only favorable comments about Enron. Merrill Lynch and Citigroup fired analysts who
published critical reports about Enron during the late 1990s. Merrill Lynch and
Citigroup discharged their analysts after Enron’s senior management complained about
their reports and warned that the analysts were undermining the banks’ relationships with
Enron.85 BNP Paribas allegedly forced an analyst to resign after he (i) published a
research report downgrading Enron to “neutral” in August 2001, and (ii) told his clients
that Enron’s securities “should be sold at all costs and sold now.”86 Also in August 2001,
UBS fired a broker, Chung Wu, after he advised a number of clients – who were also
Enron employees – that Enron’s financial situation was “deteriorating” and they should
“take some money off the table.” After receiving a strongly-worded complaint from
Enron, UBS terminated Wu and apologized to Enron. UBS also sent a message to Wu’s
clients to assure them that Enron was “likely heading higher than lower from here on
out.” UBS’ message included a copy of UBS’ most recent research report on Enron,
which included a “strong buy” rating and said that “[w]e would be aggressive buyers of
Enron at current levels.” Like Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, UBS wanted to preserve its
relationship with Enron, which included investment banking work and a lucrative
appointment as administrator of Enron’s employee stock option plan.87
Credit Suisse’s research analysts faced similar conflicts of interest with respect to
Enron. Two Credit Suisse analysts warned a Chase analyst to stay away from Enron’s
stock in October 2001, at a time when Credit Suisse’s research department maintained a
“strong buy” rating on Enron. In response, the Chase analyst questioned why “you’re
telling me one thing but [your] clients a different story??? A little shady if you ask me….
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[A]fraid to lose the banking business??? [A]re you an investment banker or equity
research analyst???”88 In a subsequent email message to his colleague, one of the Credit
Suisse analysts admitted that “[w]e were [Enron’s] number 1 supporter so the threat of a
damaging research note was zero. [T]hey needed us to publicly sell the stock almost as
much as we needed them for the fees.”89
Credit Suisse’s senior managers and investment bankers pressured another
analyst, Jill Sakol, not to publish critical reports about Enron in 2001.90 At the same
time, the head of Credit Suisse’s research department praised Sakol for communicating
her negative assessment of Enron to Credit Suisse’s bond traders, who quickly sold off
the bank’s position in debt securities issued by an Enron SPE.91 Thus, Credit Suisse, like
other universal banks, quietly reduced its credit exposure to Enron while subordinating
the interests of retail investors to the bank’s own interest in maintaining its relationship
with Enron.
The Banks’ Losses from the Enron Debacle
Enron proved to be a very costly client for its banks. By September 2006,
universal banks had paid more than $8 billion, and had surrendered about $3 billion of
their creditor claims against Enron, in order to settle various claims asserted by the SEC,
Enron’s investors, and Enron itself. Those amounts will almost certainly increase as
Enron’s investors and Enron itself continue to pursue their claims against non-settling
banks.
Citigroup, Chase, CIBC and Merrill Lynch paid nearly $400 million to settle
Enron-related charges filed against them by the SEC.92 Citigroup, Chase, CIBC, Lehman
Brothers and Bank of America paid $6.9 billion to settle claims asserted against them in a
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class action lawsuit by Enron investors.93 In September 2006, Fastow stated at his
sentencing hearing that he would provide evidence to help Enron’s investors litigate their
class action claims against non-settling banks, including Credit Suisse, Deutsche, Merrill
Lynch, Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”), RBS and Toronto Dominion.94 In addition,
Bank of America, Barclays, Chase, CIBC, Merrill Lynch, RBC, RBS, and Toronto
Dominion paid Enron $900 million and surrendered creditor claims worth about $3
billion, in order to settle claims filed by Enron itself. As of November 2006, Enron was
still pursuing claims against Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche and Merrill Lynch.95
UNIVERSAL BANKS AND WORLDCOM
The Rise and Fall of WorldCom
The chronicle of WorldCom’s rapid ascent and sudden collapse resembles
Enron’s story in a number of respects. Like Enron, WorldCom grew from humble
beginnings to become a leading “New Economy” firm and a favorite of institutional
investors during the late 1990s. Like Enron’s officials, WorldCom’s managers sought to
pump up their company’s stock price by promising to meet aggressive earnings targets
set by Wall Street analysts. Like Enron, WorldCom depended on universal banks to
arrange the financing the company needed for its rapid expansion. Like Enron,
WorldCom resorted to accounting fraud when it could not produce the revenues and
earnings it promised to Wall Street.96 Finally, the top managers of WorldCom – like
those of Enron – were unrelenting in their drive to achieve dominance in their industry.
For a time, Wall Street analysts and institutional investors had complete confidence in
the ability of WorldCom’s managers to achieve their ambitious goals. Bernie Ebbers and
Scott Sullivan (WorldCom’s CEO and CFO) “were considered one of the best pairings in
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American business in the late 1990s as WorldCom’s stock soared, often finishing each
other’s sentences when talking to adoring Wall Street analysts.”97 At the end of 2001,
institutional investors owned 56.5% of WorldCom’s stock (just as institutional investors
had owned about 60% of Enron’s stock at the end of 2000).98
WorldCom and its predecessor, Long Distance Discount Services, Inc. (“LDDS”),
aggressively pursued business opportunities created by the deregulation of the
telecommunications (telecom) industry following the breakup of AT&T’s telephone
monopoly in 1984. LDDS began operating in 1983 as a small provider of discount longdistance telephone services to Mississippi customers. In 1985, LDDS hired Bernie
Ebbers as its CEO. Ebbers was a former high school basketball coach who owned a
chain of motels. He had no prior experience in the telecom business, but he had
unlimited ambition and “unshakeable optimism.”99
Between 1985 and 2001, LDDS (renamed WorldCom in 1995) acquired more
than seventy companies for total consideration valued at more than $100 billion. By
2001, WorldCom was the second largest long-distance telephone company and the
largest provider of Internet-based communications services in the United States.100 The
rapid growth of LDDS and WorldCom occurred in several stages. First, LDDS and
WorldCom acquired a series of domestic and international providers of long-distance
telephone services to exploit the deregulation of the long-distance market that began in
1984. Second, WorldCom entered the local telephone business shortly after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed legal barriers that had previously barred longdistance carriers from offering local calling services. In December 1996, WorldCom
acquired MFS Communications, thereby securing access to local telephone networks in a
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number of major U.S. and European metropolitan markets. In addition, by acquiring
UUNet, a subsidiary of MFS, WorldCom gained the ability to offer Internet
communications services. Third, WorldCom cemented its status as a leading competitor
in markets for local, long-distance and international communications when it acquired
MCI Communications in 1998. Fourth, WorldCom significantly expanded its wireless
communications business by purchasing Skytel Communications and two other wireless
providers in 1999. WorldCom then agreed to a merger with Sprint, which would have
created the largest telecom firm in the United States. However, WorldCom was forced to
abandon the Sprint transaction in July 2000, after the U.S. Justice Department and the
European Union opposed the deal on antitrust grounds. WorldCom’s last major
acquisition occurred in September 2000, when it agreed to purchase Intermedia,
primarily for the purpose of acquiring the web hosting business operated by Digex (a
subsidiary of Intermedia).101
WorldCom invested massive amounts in an effort to create a global network of
fiber-optic cables, telephone lines and wireless facilities that could offer a full range of
telecom, video and Internet services to commercial and residential customers. In
addition to installing its own network of lines, WorldCom entered into long-term leases
to use the lines of other telecom firms. Many of those leases required WorldCom to
make fixed monthly payments regardless of whether WorldCom or its customers actually
used the leased lines. By 2000, line costs were WorldCom’s largest expense item and
represented about half of its operating costs.102
At its peak in mid-1999, WorldCom had a market capitalization of $180 billion.
WorldCom’s reported revenues reached $39 billion in 2000, based on operations in 65
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nations.103 WorldCom’s growth strategy depended on continuous increases in its stock
price, which it used as currency to pay for acquiring other companies. Wall Street
analysts and institutional investors supported a high stock price for WorldCom as long as
its reported revenues grew at an annual rate of 12-15%. Through the first quarter of
2000, WorldCom met Wall Street’s expectations. WorldCom inflated its reported
revenues and earnings by drawing down accounting reserves, including reserves for
estimated merger expenses that WorldCom had established when it acquired other
companies. Analysts and investors had not questioned WorldCom’s establishment of
large reserves to cover merger-related costs, and WorldCom drew upon those reserves to
boost its revenues and profits.104
The collapse of the Sprint merger in 2000 deprived WorldCom of a major source
of additional revenues and also prevented it from creating new reserves for merger costs.
Moreover, conditions in the telecom business became intensely competitive and
WorldCom’s profits fell sharply after 1999. Like WorldCom, thousands of firms had
entered domestic and foreign markets for local, long-distance, Internet and wireless
communications services during the 1990s. By 2000, the telecom industry was plagued
by overinvestment, heavy debt burdens and excess capacity. Compounding these
problems, the collapse of many “dot com” firms in 2000 caused a sharp decline in the
demand for communications services.105 Because of these adverse developments,
WorldCom’s operating revenues declined after the fourth quarter of 1999. From late
1999 through early.2001, Sullivan (with Ebbers’ knowledge) instructed WorldCom’s
accounting staff to use at least $3.3 billion in reserves to absorb line costs and increase
WorldCom’s reported earnings, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles
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(“GAAP”). After WorldCom exhausted its available reserves in early 2001, Sullivan
(again with Ebbers’ knowledge) directed WorldCom’s accounting staff to capitalize $3.8
billion of WorldCom’s line costs during 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. Sullivan’s
capitalization of line costs reduced WorldCom’s reported expenses and boosted its
reported profits, once again in clear violation of GAAP.106
According to Sullivan’s testimony at Ebbers’ criminal trial, Ebbers repeatedly
told Sullivan during 2000-02 that “[w]e have to hit our numbers.” At the same time,
Ebbers assured the public that WorldCom was achieving “very solid growth” and “there
were no storms on the horizon.” In February 2002, Ebbers declared during a conference
call with investors and analysts that “[w]e stand by our accounting” and “[t]o question
WorldCom’s viability is utter nonsense.”107 Ebbers resigned as CEO at the end of April
2002. Less than two months later, WorldCom’s internal auditors discovered Sullivan’s
illegal capitalization of line costs. On June 25, 2002, WorldCom’s board of directors
fired Sullivan and publicly announced a restatement that reduced its previously reported
earnings by $3.8 billion. As was true at Enron, WorldCom’s disclosure of its accounting
violations triggered a rapid collapse of confidence among its investors and creditors. On
July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.108
At the time of its bankruptcy filing, WorldCom reported assets of $107 billion
and debts of $41 billion. However, about half of WorldCom’s reported assets consisted
of goodwill, representing the premium above fair market value that WorldCom had paid
when it acquired other companies.109 In 2004, WorldCom (renamed MCI) issued a final
restatement that reduced its previously-reported pretax earnings by $74.4 billion. Of that
amount, MCI allocated $10.6 billion to accounting fraud and attributed most of the
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remainder to the decline in value of MCI’s goodwill.110 Less than two years later,
Verizon acquired MCI’s remaining assets for only $8.5 billion.111
The Banks’ Involvement in the WorldCom Debacle
As described in the previous section, WorldCom’s managers accomplished their
fraud primarily by manipulating accounting entries. James Fanto has pointed out that
WorldCom’s fraud was different from Enron’s deceptions, because WorldCom’s
managers did not use “SPEs and structured finance, which demand intensive investment
banking involvement.”112 Consequently, universal banks did not have the same degree of
direct involvement in WorldCom’s fraud as they did with Enron’s abuses. Nevertheless,
in at least two ways, banks played a “significant” role in the WorldCom disaster.113 First,
they actively promoted WorldCom’s aggressive and ultimately fatal growth strategy by
persuading investors to purchase WorldCom’s securities, by providing large loans to
WorldCom, and by issuing analysts’ reports with glowing evaluations of WorldCom’s
future prospects. Second, at least three banks – Citigroup, Bank of America and Chase –
participated in the corruption of WorldCom’s management by providing Ebbers with
extraordinary financial benefits in order to win WorldCom’s business.
Universal banks underwrote huge public and private offerings of debt and equity
securities by WorldCom. Citigroup and its predecessors were sole lead managers for
public offerings of more than $8 billion of WorldCom debt securities in 1997 and 1998.
Citigroup and Chase jointly led two public offerings of WorldCom bonds – the first for
$5 billion in 2000, and the second for $11.9 billion in 2001. Chase acted as sole lead
manager for a $2 billion private offering of WorldCom notes in 2000.114 Both Citigroup
and Chase were also directly involved in offerings of WorldCom stock. Citigroup was
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the principal financial advisor for WorldCom’s acquisitions of MFS and MCI, resulting
in the issuance of more than $50 billion of WorldCom stock to the shareholders of MFS
and MCI. Chase was the principal financial advisor for WorldCom’s acquisition of
Intermedia, resulting in the issuance of $5.8 billion of WorldCom stock to Intermedia’s
shareholders.115 Bank of America acted as lead arranger for a $10.75 billion syndicated
loan in 2000, and it was also one of five arrangers for a $2 billion trade receivable
securitization program. Bank of America also participated in WorldCom’s public bond
offerings in 1998, 2000 and 2001.116
Events in 2001 confirmed the close connection between the underwriting and
lending activities of WorldCom’s banks. In March 2001, WorldCom asked its banks for
a syndicated loan for up to $10 billion in order to refinance its existing bank debt.
WorldCom told its leading banks – including Citigroup, Chase and Bank of America –
that they must each provide at least $800 million of the new syndicated loan in order to
secure roles as lead underwriters for WorldCom’s planned $11.9 billion bond offering in
May 2001. The banks agreed to provide the requested loan, even though they had
increasing doubts about WorldCom’s financial strength.117 As discussed below, some of
the banks quietly reduced their lending exposures to WorldCom but none of them
disclosed their doubts to public investors.
Bank of America, Chase and Citigroup also provided extensive personal benefits
to Ebbers to solidify their positions as WorldCom’s leading bankers. Bank of America
provided Ebbers with $200 million of personal loans that were secured by his WorldCom
stock. Ebbers used those loans (together with more than $100 million of loans from
other banks and securities brokers) to purchase a large ranch in Canada, a shipyard and
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yacht building business in Georgia, a trucking company, and 600,000 acres of timberland
in Alabama and Mississippi. Ebbers’ relationship with Bank of America became
severely strained, however, when WorldCom’s stock price declined sharply during 2000
and 2001. The fall in WorldCom’s stock price triggered repeated margin calls on Ebbers
by Bank of America. WorldCom ultimately agreed to repay all of Ebbers’ loans from
Bank of America in order to avoid a massive sale of WorldCom stock by the bank.118
In April 2001, Chase gave Ebbers a $20 million line of credit, even though Chase
knew that Ebbers already had more than $300 million in outstanding personal loans
secured by his WorldCom stock. Investment bankers at Chase urged their personal
banking colleagues to approve the loan in order to strengthen Chase’s relationship with
Ebbers and WorldCom.119
Citigroup and its predecessors, Salomon Brothers and SSB, provided the most
extraordinary favors to Ebbers. In June 1996, at a time when Salomon was seeking to
establish an investment banking relationship with WorldCom, Salomon allocated to
Ebbers 200,000 shares of an IPO made by McLeod Inc., a Salomon underwriting client.
Salomon’s allocation of McLeod stock to Ebbers was more than four times larger than
any other allocation made to a retail customer. Two months after the McLeod IPO,
WorldCom retained Salomon as its financial advisor for the acquisition of MFS. From
1996 through 2002, WorldCom paid Salomon/SSB and Citigroup more than $140 million
of fees, including $107 million for services provided in connection with nine major
transactions. During the same period, Salomon and Citigroup allocated stock to Ebbers
in twenty-two IPOs or secondary offerings made by underwriting clients. Ebbers earned
trading profits of $12.8 million from those allocations (including $2.16 million from the
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McLeod IPO). WorldCom’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that these allocations “were
intended to and did influence Mr. Ebbers to award WorldCom investment banking
business to Salomon/SSB. . . . Salomon/SSB came to be WorldCom’s preferred
investment banker on both acquisition and financings.”120
SSB continued to provide IPO allocations to Ebbers after Travelers (SSB’s parent
company) acquired Salomon in 1997, even though SSB had adopted a policy that
prohibited “spinning.” SSB’s anti-spinning policy declared that “shares may not be
allocated to an executive of a corporate client or prospect as a quid pro quo for receiving
investment banking or other business from his or her corporate employer.” SSB
apparently disregarded its policy and continued to give allocations to Ebbers because
WorldCom was one of SSB’s premier clients. In April 2003, Citigroup consented to the
entry of an SEC order declaring that Salomon/SSB’s allocations of IPO shares to Ebbers
constituted unlawful spinning in violation of rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange.121
Citigroup also provided huge loans to Ebbers. In 1999, Citigroup lent $63 million
to Ebbers to refinance the loan on his Canadian ranch.122 In February 2000, Travelers
syndicated a $499 million loan to Joshua Timberland, a company controlled by Ebbers.123
In October 2000, Ebbers asked Citigroup for additional credit. After an extensive review,
Citigroup’s senior management approved an additional personal loan in light of the “high
profile/quality of Ebbers as a Citigroup client, both individually and as CEO of
WorldCom.” Citigroup lent Ebbers $53 million, including a refinancing of his existing
loan balance of $41.7 million.124 Citigroup had good reasons to accommodate Ebbers
because (i) Citigroup knew that Ebbers resented Bank of America’s margin calls, and
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Citigroup wanted to replace Bank of America as the leading provider of corporate
banking services to WorldCom, and (ii) Citigroup was concerned that WorldCom was
developing a strong investment banking relationship with Chase. In November 2000,
despite the continuing decline in WorldCom’s stock price, Citigroup decided not to make
a margin call on Ebbers, given “the strength of the corporate finance relationship
between SSB and WorldCom.” Citigroup did not make any margin calls on Ebbers until
May 3, 2002, four days after he resigned as WorldCom’s CEO.125 WorldCom’s
bankruptcy examiner concluded that Citigroup’s loans to Ebbers “constituted another
form of ‘spinning,’ a means of obtaining and/or keeping corporate business as a result of
personal financial favors provided to corporate executives.”126
The Bank Underwriters’ Failure to Protect WorldCom’s Investors
In February 2001, Bank of America, Chase and Deutsche each downgraded
WorldCom in their confidential internal credit ratings. The banks reduced their internal
credit ratings for WorldCom due to concerns about the company’s rapidly increasing
debt, its lack of revenue growth, competitive pressures on its long-distance business, and
its lack of a strategic plan after abandoning the proposed merger with Sprint.127 In
addition, Bank of America and Chase reduced their lending exposures to WorldCom by
entering into credit default swaps and other hedging transactions, but both banks did so
quietly in order to avoid offending WorldCom.128 Notwithstanding their growing
concerns about WorldCom, all three banks acted as underwriters for WorldCom’s $11.9
billion public offering of bonds in May 2001. Chase acted as a joint lead manager for the
bond offering along with Citigroup, and both banks participated in a “road show” in
America and Europe to promote the sale of the bonds. The road show script stated that

34

“[w]e are excited about the WorldCom credit story and this debt offering. . . .
WorldCom’s financial position gives it the strongest credit profile of any of the largest
broadband providers.”129
The offering prospectus and road show script for the 2001 bond offering did not
disclose that any of the bank underwriters had previously downgraded WorldCom in their
internal credit ratings or had reduced their credit exposures to WorldCom through
hedging transactions. The prospectuses for the 2000 and 2001 bond offerings also did
not contain a “risk factors” section describing the specific investment risks associated
with the bonds. In August 2002, bond purchasers filed a class action lawsuit against the
seventeen bank underwriters, alleging that the underwriters failed to exercise due
diligence to ensure that the prospectus for each offering disclosed all material facts
concerning the bonds’ investment risks. The purchasers alleged that the underwriters
knew sufficient facts to put them on notice that WorldCom’s financial statements for
1999 and 2000 were materially misleading, particularly with respect to the treatment of
line costs as capital expenditures rather than operating expenses. The purchasers also
charged that the underwriters should have known that the bond offering prospectuses
omitted many other material facts, including (i) the lack of specific disclosure of the “risk
factors” associated with the bonds, including the deterioration of WorldCom’s longdistance business, (ii) the omission of information concerning the loans and IPO
allocations Ebbers received from bank underwriters, and (iii) the absence of any
information about the underwriters’ actions in reducing their internal credit ratings and
hedging their credit exposures during early 2001.130 A federal district court ruled in
2004 that federal law did not explicitly require the underwriters to disclose their internal
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credit ratings or hedging activities with regard to WorldCom. However, the court held
that the underwriters’ actions (which indicated their concerns about WorldCom) and the
other omissions cited above raised legitimate issues to be resolved at trial as to whether
the underwriters failed to satisfy their duties of due diligence and reasonable care under
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.131
The conflicts of interest faced by the bank underwriters were further reflected in
Deutsche’s conduct shortly before WorldCom collapsed. On April 12, 2002, John
Tierney, Deutsche’s head of credit derivatives strategy, published a note stating that
WorldCom was headed for bankruptcy or an involuntary merger. Tierney also warned
that “recovery values for a WorldCom bankruptcy could be quite low, less than 30
percent.” Five days later, Deutsche retracted Tierney’s note and claimed that it had been
issued by mistake.132 As discussed below, the bank underwriters eventually settled the
claims filed against them by the bond purchasers, and Chase, Bank of America and
Deutsche paid the largest amounts with the exception of Citigroup.
Citigroup’s Disregard for Investors’ Interests
Citigroup undoubtedly played the most significant role in encouraging investors
to buy WorldCom’s securities. The class action filed by purchasers of WorldCom’s
bonds and stock alleged that Citigroup violated its duty as an underwriter under the 1933
Act and also committed securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The
purchasers’ allegation of securities fraud presented two major claims. First, the
purchasers maintained that Citigroup and Jack Grubman (its leading telecom analyst)
established “an illicit quid pro quo arrangement” with WorldCom’s senior management
and had actual knowledge about material misstatements and omissions contained in the
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bond offering prospectuses. Second, the purchasers charged that Grubman and
Citigroup’s research department knowingly issued misleading reports to investors “that
touted WorldCom’s value and vigorously encouraged investors” to buy WorldCom’s
securities, even though Citigroup knew that “the integrity and objectivity of its research
department was compromised by the department’s decision to serve the needs of the
firm’s investment bankers at the expense of providing investors with independent
analysis.”133 As discussed below, Citigroup was the first bank underwriter to settle the
purchasers’ claims, and it paid the largest amount of any settling bank.
Grubman developed a close personal relationship with WorldCom’s senior
management and became a principal advisor to Ebbers and WorldCom’s board. After he
joined Salomon in 1994, Grubman coordinated Salomon’s efforts to attract WorldCom as
a client. As noted above, Salomon became WorldCom’s primary investment bank after it
provided an exceptionally generous allocation to Ebbers in the McLeod IPO and also
helped to arrange WorldCom’s acquisition of MFS (a Salomon client).134 Grubman
attended at least four WorldCom board meetings and advised WorldCom’s directors on
major transactions, including the merger with MCI in late 1997 and the attempted merger
with Sprint in late 1999. Grubman also advised WorldCom’s managers as to how they
should respond to press reports about WorldCom and how they should answer anticipated
questions during conference calls with investors and analysts. WorldCom’s board
minutes described Grubman as a “financial advisor” to the company, despite his official
position as an investment analyst.135
Grubman saw no conflict between his status as an investment analyst and his role
as a key business advisor to Ebbers and other CEOs of telecom firms. Nor did Grubman
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see any problem with his active role in helping Citigroup to arrange investment banking
transactions for his clients. Grubman claimed credit for helping to generate over $600
million in investment banking revenues for Citigroup in 2000, and he asked Citigroup’s
investment banking department to reimburse his expenses for attending Ebbers’
wedding.136 In a May 2000 interview, Grubman proclaimed, “I’m sculpting the industry.
. . . I get feedback from institutions and CEOs. It feeds on itself. It’s a virtuous circle.”
Grubman dismissed critics who claimed that his close ties with telecom executives
compromised his objectivity. Grubman declared, “What used to be a conflict is now a
synergy . . . . [Institutional investors] know that I’m in the flow of what’s going on. . . .
Objective? The other word for that is uninformed.”137
WorldCom’s growth strategy dovetailed perfectly with Grubman’s vision of the
telecom industry’s future. Grubman maintained that telecom firms must build broadband
networks that would transmit a full range of voice, video and Internet services. He
argued that “the demand for bandwidth is basically insatiable” because telecom services
were becoming “part of the Web-centric society.” Thus, in Grubman’s view, the longterm survivors in the telecom industry would be firms that pursued an aggressive strategy
“to marry [bandwidth] networks and customers.”138 His prediction of an inexhaustible
demand for bandwidth was consistent with WorldCom’s repeated claims that Internet
traffic was doubling every 100 days.139 His clients and other telecom firms rushed to
build national and global fiber-optic networks, and the amount of installed fiber increased
fivefold between 1998 and 2001.140
Grubman’s status as the “king of telecom” helped Citigroup to become the top
underwriter for telecom firms. During 1996-2002, Citigroup earned $1.2 billion in fees
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from telecom firms and underwrote $190 billion of their debt and equity securities,
representing a quarter of all issuances of telecom stocks and bonds during that period.141
Citigroup rewarded Grubman by paying him $67.5 million between 1999 and 2002.142 In
May 2000, Eduardo Mestre, Citigroup’s co-head of investment banking, commented that
Grubman “has had a thesis for creating value in the telecom sector that’s been dead right:
Build it and they will come. . . . It wasn’t a foregone conclusion that the thesis would be
correct.”143
Mestre’s comment soon proved to be cruelly ironic. By 2002, analysts denounced
Grubman’s vision of telecom’s future as “wildly hyped.”144 Instead of doubling every
100 days, Internet traffic doubled only every year. Meanwhile, technological advances
increased the data transmission capacity of fiber-optic lines by up to 1,000 times between
1995 and 2002. Consequently, the frenzied installation of broadband networks by
Grubman’s clients and their rivals produced a massive glut of transmission capacity. By
September 2002, only about three percent of installed bandwidth capacity was being
used, and many of Grubman’s leading clients – including WorldCom, Global Crossing,
McLeodUSA, Metromedia Fiber Networks, Rhythms Netconnections, Winstar and XO
Communications – had filed for bankruptcy.145
Grubman’s research reports promoted WorldCom more than any other firm. His
reports described WorldCom as “our favorite stock” in August 1997 and as a “must-own”
stock in November 1998. He urged investors to “load up the truck” with WorldCom
stock in August 1999.146 In response to the severe decline in WorldCom’s stock price
during 2000-01, Grubman argued that WorldCom’s critics were mistaken, and he
encouraged investors to take advantage of the company’s “dirt cheap” stock price.147 He
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maintained the highest “buy” rating on WorldCom’s stock from January 1997 through
April 2002. On February 4, 2002, Grubman published a research note in which he
contended that WorldCom’s stock price “has been unduly punished by a multitude of
factors . . . [and] has more than corrected for any actual impacts from those issues.
Therefore, we believe that [WorldCom] at this point represents a very compelling value
proposition for a telecom company.”148 Also in February 2002, Grubman supported
WorldCom’s projection that it would generate positive free cash flow during the second
quarter of 2002.149
Grubman did not reduce his rating on WorldCom to “neutral” until April 21,
2002, eight days before Ebbers resigned as CEO. He did not downgrade WorldCom to
“underperform” (sell) until June 21, 2002, a month before WorldCom filed for
bankruptcy.150 Of course, Grubman was hardly alone in giving WorldCom strong “buy”
ratings during 2000-02. Many analysts (including those employed by three major Wall
Street brokerage firms) maintained such ratings on WorldCom at the end of 2001.
However, other analysts disagreed with Grubman. Analysts at Wachovia Securities and
BlueStone Capital (an independent research firm) posted neutral ratings on WorldCom
beginning in March 2001. Analysts at Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley also issued
neutral ratings before the end of 2001.151
Grubman’s consistently bullish investment ratings were matched by his unusually
aggressive target prices for WorldCom’s stock. From February 1997 through January
2002, Grubman established target prices for WorldCom’s stock that were (with few
exceptions) the highest quoted by any analyst. During that period, virtually all of

40

Grubman’s target prices were at least 50% above WorldCom’s actual stock price, and
many of his target prices were 100% or more above the actual stock price.152
During an appearance before a congressional committee on July 8, 2002,
Grubman testified that he did not know about any fraudulent accounting at WorldCom
until it was disclosed by the company two weeks earlier. Grubman declared that
“WorldCom is a company I believed in wholeheartedly for a long time” and “[a]ll my
beliefs have been honestly held.”153 He also stated that he was “sorry to see investors
suffer losses” based on his faulty analysis of the telecom industry, and he denied that his
analysis was motivated by conflicts of interest.154 Similarly, in his letter of resignation to
Citigroup in August 2002, Grubman apologized for “failing to predict” the telecom
industry’s collapse, but he again insisted, “I always wrote what I believed and based my
opinions on a long and sincerely held investment thesis.”155
Despite his protestations of honesty and good faith, Grubman consented to the
SEC’s entry of an order on April 28, 2003, finding that (i) Grubman published fraudulent
research reports in 2001 on two telecom firms (Focal Communications and Metromedia
Fiber), and (ii) Grubman wanted to downgrade Focal and five other telecom providers in
April 2001, but he refrained from doing so because of pressure applied by Citigroup’s
investment bankers. In addition, the SEC charged that Grubman raised his rating on
AT&T’s stock from neutral to strong buy in November 1999, at the urging of Citigroup’s
co-CEO, Sanford (Sandy) Weill. Weill asked Grubman take a “fresh look” at AT&T in
order to help Citigroup win an underwriting mandate for AT&T’s planned offering of a
wireless tracking stock. In return, Grubman asked Weill to help persuade the 92nd Street
Y’s highly selective preschool to admit Grubman’s children. Grubman’s upgrade of
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AT&T’s stock was a crucial factor in persuading AT&T to appoint Citigroup as lead
underwriter for its $10.6 billion offering of wireless tracking stock. Grubman’s children
were admitted to the Y’s preschool after Weill spoke to a member of the Y’s board and
arranged for the Citigroup Foundation to make a $1 million donation to the Y.156
The SEC quoted internal emails sent by Grubman to colleagues in which (1) he
called Focal a “pig,” (2) he acknowledged that “most of our banking clients are going to
zero and you know I wanted to downgrade them months ago but got huge pushback from
banking,” and (3) he admitted that he “upgraded [AT&T] to get . . . Sandy to get my kids
into 92nd St Y pre-school (which is harder than Harvard),” and he subsequently “went
back to my normal negative self on [AT&T].”157 While Grubman did not admit or deny
the SEC’s allegations, he paid a $15 million penalty and consented to a lifetime ban from
the securities industry.158
On the same date that Grubman settled with the SEC, Citigroup paid a $400
million penalty and consented to the entry of an SEC enforcement order. The SEC
charged that (i) Citigroup encouraged Grubman and other investment analysts to support
Citigroup’s investment banking activities and allowed Grubman and other analysts to
issue false and misleading reports to investors about several telecom firms, and (ii)
Citigroup approved unlawful “spinning” of IPO allocations to Ebbers and other
executives of existing or potential clients for the purpose of attracting additional
investment banking business.159 In May 2004, Citigroup agreed to pay $2.6 billion to
settle the WorldCom investors’ class action soon after the investors’ counsel filed a court
brief, which cited evidence indicating that “the ‘most senior officers of Salomon’
acknowledged privately that its investment bankers had pressured its analysts to avoid
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negative ratings and that ‘providing accurate stock ratings conflicted with Salomon’s
paramount goals of securing investment banking business.’”160
The SEC’s complaints against Grubman and Citigroup did not allege that
Grubman issued false research reports with respect to WorldCom. However, the SEC’s
charges seriously undermined Grubman’s claims of objectivity and honesty. Moreover,
the WorldCom investors’ class action alleged that, in early 2000, Grubman began to use a
“cash earnings” model for WorldCom’s operating results that departed from his previous
“discounted cash flow” model. The investors charged that Grubman’s new model –
which he did not use for any other telecom firm – omitted capital expenditures, a central
component of WorldCom’s fraud. A federal district court denied motions by Citigroup
and Grubman to dismiss the investors’ complaint, finding that the complaint “describes
strong circumstantial evidence that Grubman learned of at least the capital expenditure
fraud.”161
The Banks’ Losses from the WorldCom Disaster
Like Enron, WorldCom proved to be an extremely costly client. Seventeen banks
that served as underwriters for WorldCom paid more than $6 billion to settle the
WorldCom investors’ class action, with the largest amounts being paid by Citigroup
($2.6 billion), Chase ($2 billion), Bank of America ($460 million), and Deutsche ($325
million).162 The same group of banks paid over $600 million to settle additional lawsuits
filed by institutional investors who did not participate in the class action.163 In
announcing Citigroup’s decision to settle the class action, chairman Charles Prince
denied that his bank had violated any laws and said that it had chosen to buy an
“insurance policy . . . against a roll of a dice in front of a jury . . . [on] a $54 billion
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claim.”164 However, a prominent bank analyst concluded that Citigroup had effectively
“admitted guilt” in view of the extraordinary size of its settlement payment.165
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented above shows that universal banks aided and abetted
violations of corporate governance rules and federal securities laws by officers of Enron
and WorldCom. Bank officials also repeatedly disregarded risk management policies
established by their own banks. In my view, the Enron and WorldCom episodes indicate
that GLBA’s current regulatory framework is not adequate to control the promotional
pressures, conflicts of interest and risk-taking incentives that are generated by the
commingling of commercial and investment banking. A comprehensive reform of the
supervisory system for universal banks is urgently needed and must become a top priority
for Congress and financial regulators. I intend to discuss needed supervisory reforms in a
future work.
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